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Abstract
The relationship between the number of rms and price competition is a cen-
tral issue in economics. To explore this relationship, we modify Varians (1980)
model and assume that rms are privately informed about their costs of produc-
tion. Allowing that the support of possible cost types may be large, we show that an
increase in the number of rms induces lower (higher) prices for lower-cost (higher-
cost) rms. We also characterize the pricing distribution as the number of rms
approaches innity, nding that the equilibrium pricing function converges to the
monopoly pricing function for all but the lowest possible cost type. If demand is
inelastic, an increase in the number of rms raises social welfare. If in addition the
distribution of types is log concave, then an increase in the number of rms raises
aggregate consumer surplus and lowers producer surplus. We identify conditions,
however, under which uninformed consumers are harmed, and informed consumers
are helped, when the number of rms is larger. By contrast, when the number of
rms is held xed, a policy that increases the share of informed consumers benets
informed and uninformed consumers. Finally, we conrm that results previously ob-
tained in Varians (1980) complete-information model can be captured in our model
as a limiting case when the support of possible cost types approaches zero.
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1 Introduction
We consider a model of price competition among rms selling a homogeneous good. The
model has two key features: rms are privately informed as to their respective costs, and
consumers are heterogeneously informed about the prices in the market. In this context,
we address several basic questions: Does price competition become more intense as the
number of rms increases? Do lower- and higher-cost rms respond di¤erentially to an
increase in the number of rms? How does new entry a¤ect consumer surplus, producer
surplus and social welfare? Does the impact of entry on a consumers surplus depend
upon the extent to which the consumer is informed about available prices?
Our model is a modied version of Varians (1980) model. Varian (1980) assumes that
consumers are heterogeneous in the following sense: a fraction of consumers are informed
about prices and purchase from the rms(s) with the lowest price, while the remaining
fraction are uninformed about prices and randomly choose rms from which to purchase.
Varians (1980) model is characterized by a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
This equilibrium reects the tradeo¤ that a rm faces between reducing its price so as to
increase the rms probability of winning the informed consumers and increasing its price
so as to earn more on the rms captive stock of uninformed consumers. Following Spulber
(1995), Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002) and Bagwell and Lee (2010), we modify Varians
model to allow that rms have heterogeneous cost types drawn from an interval and are
privately informed about their respective cost types.1 We assume further that a cost type
for a rm determines that rms constant marginal cost of production. A consequence
of our incomplete-information approach is that the unique symmetric pricing equilibrium
takes the form of a pure strategy.2
An important benet of our model is that we can examine how a rms response to an
increase in the number of rms, N , depends upon the rms cost type. An increase in N
generates both price-decreasing and price-increasing forces. On the one hand, an increase
in N may lead to lower prices, as some rms compete more aggressively for informed
consumers. On the other hand, an increase in N may lead to higher prices, as some rms
become discouraged about the prospect of winning informed consumers and thus focus on
sales to uninformed consumers. Our analysis reveals that the balance of these competing
forces hinges on a rms cost type: as N rises, lower-cost rms reduce prices while higher-
1Our model is also distinct from Varians (1980), since we take the number of rms to be exogenous.
Assuming a positive xed cost of entry and using a free-entry condition, Varian (1980) endogenizes the
number of rms.
2Spulber (1995) establishes the existence of a unique equilbrium when all consumers are informed,
while Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002) and Bagwell and Lee (2010) assume that some consumers are unin-
formed. Further discussion of this work is provided at the end of Section 2.
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cost rms increase prices. An interesting implication of this nding is that the potential
extent of price dispersion, as measured by the support of possible equilibrium prices, is
larger in markets with a greater number of rms.
We also characterize the equilibrium pricing function when the number of rms ap-
proaches innity. As N gets su¢ ciently large, the cuto¤ type above which rms increase
prices is close to the lowest possible cost type, the prices for all types above the cuto¤
type are approximately equal to their respective monopoly prices, and the prices for types
near the lowest possible cost type are approximately equal to their respective marginal
costs. Thus, as N approaches innity, the equilibrium pricing function converges to the
monopoly pricing function for all but the lowest possible cost type whose price converges
to marginal cost.
The equilibrium pricing function also varies interestingly with the share of informed
consumers, I 2 (0; 1). While an increase in N lowers the price of only lower-cost rms, an
increase in I reduces the price of all cost types other than the highest possible cost type.
As I increases, the price of a rm with the highest possible cost type remains xed at the
monopoly level. Thus, if the number of rms is held xed, then a policy that increases
the share of informed consumers benets uninformed and informed consumers.
We next analyze the welfare implications of an increase in N . Our formal results here
are obtained in the setting with inelastic demand. For any distribution function of cost
types, we nd that an increase in N increases social welfare. Intuitively, an increase in
N lowers the expected cost of the rm that sells to informed consumers. Further, if the
distribution function of cost types is log-concave, then an increase in N raises aggregate
consumer surplus and lowers aggregate producer surplus.3 We also consider the impact
of an increase in N on the respective surpluses of informed and uninformed consumers.
Importantly, we identify conditions under which uninformed consumers are harmed when
the number of rms is larger. First, we show that, for any N , there exists N > N
such that uninformed consumers enjoy higher consumer surplus with N rms than for
any number of rms in excess of N: Second, we establish that an increase in N harms
uninformed consumers if the support of possible cost types is su¢ ciently small. The key
intuition is that a larger number of rms may discourage price competition by higher-cost
rms and thereby increase the expected price paid by uninformed consumers. By contrast,
informed consumers purchase from the lowest-cost rm in the market and gain under the
same conditions when the number of rms is larger. We also provide numerical examples
with related ndings when N is small and the support of possible cost types may be large.
To further relate our ndings to those in the literature, we provide as well a purication
3In fact, as we show, an increase in N raises aggregate consumer surplus under a weaker distributional
assumption.
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result: the pure-strategy equilibrium distribution of prices in our incomplete-information
model corresponds to the mixed-strategy equilibrium distribution of prices in Varians
(1980) complete-information model, when the support of possible costs in our model is
su¢ ciently small. From this perspective, we may relate our ndings to those of Morgan,
Orzen and Sefton (2006). They study Varians (1980) model and show that an increase
in N lowers the surplus of uninformed consumers and increases the surplus of informed
consumers. The counterpart results in our model obtain when the support of possible cost
types is su¢ ciently small. As noted above, however, we also show that a su¢ ciently large
increase in the number of rms harms uninformed consumers even when the support of
possible cost types may be large so that the purication result does not apply. A further
distinction is that our model provides a pure-strategy analysis in which an increase in N
a¤ects di¤erentially the pricing of lower- and higher-cost rms. Morgan, Orzen and Sefton
(2006) also provide novel experimental evidence in support of the general hypothesis that
an increase in N harms uninformed consumers but benets informed consumers.
The conventional view that more rms leads to more competitive pricing has been
challenged in other models as well. Rosenthal (1980) works with a Varian-style (1980)
model and shows that an increase in N may harm consumers. Di¤erently from our
analysis, however, he assumes that an increase in the number of rms is paired with
an increase in the share of uninformed consumers, so that the number of uninformed
consumers per rm is invariant. Stahl (1989) modies Varians (1980) model to allow for
costly sequential search by uninformed consumers. He also nds that an increase in N
generates price-decreasing and price-increasing forces, where the latter force strengthens
relative to the former asN increases. Janssen andMoraga-Gonzalez (2004) explore related
themes when uninformed consumers engage in costly non-sequential search. In equilibria
in which uninformed consumers search for only one price, an increase in N raises the
expected price; however, this type of equilibrium fails to exist in their model if N is large.
Finally, Chen and Riordan (2007, 2008) and Perlo¤, Suslow and Seguin (2005) nd that,
when new entry entails product di¤erentiation, more consumer choice associated with
entry may lead to less competitive pricing. Importantly, all of these papers focus on the
heterogeneity of consumers and assume that rms have the same production costs. In
contrast, our paper allows that rms have heterogeneous costs and are privately informed
about their respective cost types.4
Our analysis of competing forces is also related to other analyses of incomplete-
information games. Hopkins and Kornienko (2007) use a price equilibrium similar to ours
4Reinganum (1979) considers a model of price dispersion when rms have heterogeneous costs and
are privately informed about their costs levels; however, in her model, there are no informed consumers,
since all consumers must search to learn price information.
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and discuss two competing e¤ects with reference to shifts in the cost distribution: if the
cost distribution shifts to make lower-cost types more likely in the sense of the monotone
likelihood ratio order, then lower-cost rms compete more intensely while higher-cost rms
become discouraged and compete less intensely. Bagwell and Lee (2010) focus primarily
on a model of advertising competition among rms that are privately informed as to their
costs. They construct an advertising equilibrium in which lower-cost rms advertise at
higher levels and nd that an increase in the number of rms generates competing forces
for the intensity of advertising competition.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and characterizes
the pricing equilibrium. Section 3 provides comparative statics results. We show there
how increases in N and I, respectively, a¤ect the equilibrium pricing function. Section
4 analyzes the welfare e¤ects of an increase in N . Section 5 describes the purication
result and connections to the related literature. Section 6 concludes. Remaining proofs
are found in the Appendix.
2 Model and Equilibrium
In this section, we introduce our basic model. Modifying the model by Varian (1980),
we assume that a xed number of rms compete in prices, where each rm is privately
informed as to its cost of production. We then establish the existence of an equilibrium
and characterize its features.
2.1 Model
We consider a market with a homogenous good and N  2 ex ante identical rms. Let i
denote the unit cost level for rm i. We assume that cost draws are iid across rms. Specif-
ically, cost type i is drawn from the support [; ] according to the twice-continuously
di¤erentiable distribution function, F (), where  >   0. The corresponding density
is given by f()  F 0(), where we assume that f() > 0 on [; ]. Importantly, we
assume that each rm i is privately informed of its unit cost level i. The market has a
unit mass of consumers. Throughout the present section and also Section 3, we assume
that each consumer has a twice-continuously di¤erentiable demand function D(p) that
satises D(p) > 0 > D0(p) over the relevant range of prices p.5 Consumers are split into
two groups. A fraction I 2 (0; 1) of consumers are informed, while the remaining fraction
U = 1   I are uninformed. An informed consumer observes rmsprices and purchases
5In Section 4, we also consider the setting in which consumer demand is inelastic, with D(p) = 1 for
all p  r where r > :
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from the rm(s) with the lowest price, whereas an uninformed consumer does not observe
prices and randomly chooses a rm from which to purchase.
We analyze the following game: (i) rms learn their own cost types, (ii) rms simulta-
neously choose their prices, and (iii) given any price information, each consumer chooses
a rm to visit and makes desired purchases. We are interested in Perfect Bayesian Equi-
libria. To this solution concept, we add two symmetry requirements. First, we focus on
equilibria in which consumers do not condition their visitation decisions on rmsnames
but instead treat rms symmetrically. This means that uninformed consumers randomly
pick a rm from the set of all rms, and informed consumers randomize over all rms that
set the lowest price (if more than one such rm exists). Second, we focus on equilibria in
which rms use symmetric price strategies. Note that when rms use symmetric pricing
strategies it is indeed optimal for uninformed consumers to use a random visit strategy.
It is of course always optimal for informed consumers to randomly select from rms that
o¤er the lowest price.6 In what follows, we thus embed optimal consumer behavior into
our denition of rm payo¤s. With this simplication, we may present our denition of
equilibrium exclusively in terms of rm strategies.
Given symmetry, a pure strategy for rm i may be dened as a function p(i) that
maps from [; ] to R+. Let p( i) denote the vector of price selections made by rms
other than i when their cost types are given by the (N   1)-tuple  i. The market share
for rm i is determined by the vector of prices selected by rm i and its rivals; hence,
the market share for rm i may be represented as m(p(i);p( i)), where the function
m maps from RN+ to [0; 1]. In particular, under our symmetry requirement for consumer
behavior, the market share function for rm i takes the following form: if p(i) < p(j)
for all j 6= i, then m(p(i);p( i)) = I + UN ; if p(i) > p(j) for some j 6= i, then
m(p(i);p( i)) = UN ; and if rm i ties with k   1 other rms for the lowest price, then
m(p(i);p( i)) = Ik +
U
N
. Let the interim-stage market share for rm i with cost type i
be represented as E i [m(p(i);p( i))].
We next dene (i; i)  (i   i)D(i) as the prot that rm i would make if it
were to set the price i and capture the entire unit mass of consumers. We assume that
(i; i) is strictly concave and twice-di¤erentiable in i and has a unique maximizer
at the monopoly price, pm(i) = arg maxi (i; i). We assume further that p
m() >
. We now dene the interim-stage prot while simplifying our notation somewhat: if
rm i has cost type i, sets the price p(i) and anticipates that its rivals employ the
strategy p to determine their prices upon observing their cost types, then its interim-
stage market share is M(p(i); p)  E i [m(p(i);p( i))] and its interim-stage prot is
6It is also always optimal for consumers to purchase o¤ of their demand curve, D(p).
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(p(i); i; p)  (p(i); i)M(p(i); p). We may now dene an equilibrium as a pricing
strategy p such that, for all i 2 [; ] and i 2 R+, (p(i); i; p)  (i; i; p).
It is also convenient to write equilibrium variables and dene equilibrium in direct
form, ignoring subscript i. If a rm with cost type  picks the price p(b) when its rivals
employ the pricing strategy p to determine their prices, then its interim-stage prot is
(b; ; p)  (p(b); ; p) = (p(b); )M(p(b); p):
The pricing strategy p is then an equilibrium if for any  2 [; ], the price p() is an
optimal choice for a rm with cost type  in comparison to all on-scheduleand o¤-
scheduledeviations. Formally, for all , p() must satisfy (i) the on-schedule incentive
constraint,
(p(); )M(p(); p)  (p(b); )M(p(b); p) for all b 6=  (On-IC())
and (ii) the o¤-schedule incentive constraint,
(p(); )M(p(); p)  (b; )M(b; p) for all b =2 p([; ]): (O¤-IC())
2.2 Equilibrium: Existence and Characterization
Having now dened an equilibrium for the model, we turn next to establish the existence
of the equilibrium and to characterize its features.
By adding two constraints, On-IC() and On-IC(b), we nd that [D(p())M(p(); p) 
D(p(b))M(p(b); p)][b ]  0, which means thatD(p())M(p(); p)must be nonincreasing
in . It then follows that p() must be nondecreasing in . Given the existence of
informed consumers, we may further conclude that p() cannot be constant over any
interval of types: by slightly decreasing its price, a rm with a type on such an interval
would enjoy a discrete gain in its expected market share. We conclude that p() must
be strictly increasing, and it thus follows that M(p(); p) = U
N
+ [1   F ()]N 1I. In
equilibrium, the expected market share is thus determined by the location of  and may
be henceforth denoted as M(b)  M(p(b); p) = U
N
+ [1   F (b)]N 1I. Since M() = U
N
,
we may conclude that a rm with the highest-cost type has no chance of winning the
informed consumers and simply selects its monopoly price, p() = pm(). For all other
cost types, the equilibrium price is lower than the monopoly price: p() < pm() for all
 < .7 Finally, given I < 1, it is also evident that p() >  and thus (p(); ) > 0 for
7Clearly, p() > pm() is impossible in equilibrium. For  < ; it is also impossible to have p() =
pm(): a rm with cost type  would then deviate, since when it slightly reduces its price from pm(), the
7
all  2 [; ]:8
We now establish the following existence and uniqueness result.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium, p() is di¤eren-
tiable and strictly increasing for  2 (; ) and satises
p0() =  (p(); )[@M()=@]
p(p(); )M()
and p() = pm(); (1)
where M() = U
N
+ [1  F ()]N 1I.
Notice that the equilibrium pricing function acts as a sorting mechanism: rms truth-
fully reveal their cost types along the upward-sloping schedule p(). In the Appendix,
we derive the remaining necessary features (namely, the di¤erentiability of p() and the
di¤erential equation (1)) and also provide the su¢ ciency argument that p() dened in
(1) constitutes an equilibrium. The intuition for this su¢ ciency is that p() in (1) satises
a local optimality condition, 1(b; ; p) = 0 for b = , which ensures that On-IC() holds
for all , due to the single-crossing property, 12 > 0.9 Further, if p() satises On-IC(),
then it also satises O¤-IC(): given that a rm with type  <  does not mimic , it
also will not select a price above p(), where p() = pm() > pm(); and given that a
rm with type  >  does not mimic , it also will not select a price below p(), where
p() < pm() < pm(). Since p() < pm(), a rm with type  that captures all informed
consumers will not select a price below p().
Proposition 1 is related to previous ndings in the literature. Drawing on arguments by
Maskin and Riley (1984), Spulber (1995) establishes the existence of a unique equilibrium
for the case in which all consumers are informed, I = 1:We assume instead that I 2 (0; 1)
and provide a related proof of equilibrium existence and uniqueness. We also note that
Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002) establish equilibrium existence when I 2 (0; 1) for the
case of inelastic demand. Finally, in their study of advertising competition, Bagwell and
Lee (2010) also briey consider a benchmark game with price competition and state the
ndings established in Proposition 1. We provide a complete proof here.
consequent marginal loss in (pm(); ) approaches zero but the marginal gain in M() remains positive.
8As just argued, p() = pm() >  is necessary. For  2 [; ); p()   is impossible, since a rm with
cost type  could earn strictly positive prot by deviating to pm() >  (i.e., by mimicking type ) and
selling at least to its share of uninformed consumers, U=N > 0:
9The single-crossing property implies that lower types nd the expected-market-share increase that
accompanies a price reduction more appealing than do higher types.
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3 Equilibrium Pricing: Comparative Statics
In this section, we further characterize the equilibrium pricing function by performing
two kinds of comparative statics. First, we investigate how an increase in the number
of rms, N , a¤ects the equilibrium price function, p(). We consider in particular how
an increase in N a¤ects pricing di¤erently for lower-cost and higher-cost rms. We also
characterize p() in the limit as N goes to innity. Second, we consider how an increase
in the fraction of informed consumers, I, a¤ects the equilibrium pricing function.
3.1 Number of Firms and Equilibrium Pricing
We begin by considering the impact of the number of rms on equilibrium pricing. A
di¢ culty is that we do not have a closed-form expression for the equilibrium pricing
function, p(); rather, p() is characterized by the di¤erential equation (1).
We therefore proceed in two steps. First, we use standard envelope arguments and
represent interim-stage prot as follows:10
(; ; p) = (pm(); )
U
N
+
Z 

D(p(x))M(x)dx: (2)
Notice that the interim-stage prot is strictly positive for all  and consists of two terms:
prot at the top and information rents. Intuitively, after accounting for incentive con-
straints, a rm of type  can earn the prot that it would earn were it to have the highest
type, , plus the information rents that are enjoyed as a consequence of its actual cost
being lower than that of the highest type. The benet of having a lower actual cost is
greater when more units are demanded, and it thus follows that the information rents
enjoyed by a rm of type  are larger when lower prices are selected by higher types.
Our second step is to evaluate @p()
@N
. To this end, we use (2) and (; ; p) 
(p(); )M(); and observe that the equilibrium p() satises
'()  (p(); )M()  (pm(); )U
N
 
Z 

D(p(x))M(x)dx = 0: (3)
For a given type  < , we next use (3) to nd that
@p()
@N
=   'N()
p(p(); )M()
: (4)
10See Milgrom and Segal (2002).
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We now consider all types  <  and check the sign of @p()
@N
. Since the denominator in (4)
is positive for all  < , the sign of @p()
@N
is determined by the sign of  'N() for all  < .
As we show in the Appendix, the endpoints conditions satisfy 'N() > 0 and 'N() = 0.
Furthermore, there exists a unique type  2 (; ) and a unique type  2 (; ) such
that 'N() > 0 for  2 [; ), 'N() < 0 for  2 (; ) and 'N() = 0 for  2 f; g.
The level of  is determined by () = 0 where
()  U
N

1
N
+
1
N   1

+
U
N
ln [1  F ()] + I
N   1 [1  F ()]
N 1 : (5)
Observe that () is strictly decreasing in , and that there exists a unique value  2
(; ) at which () = 0.
We may now present the following nding:
Proposition 2. For any N , there exists a unique type  2 (; ) such that an increase
in N implies that the equilibrium p() strictly decreases for  2 [; ), strictly increases
for  2 (; ) and is unchanged for  2 f; g.
An interesting implication of Proposition 2 is that the potential extent of price dispersion,
as measured by the support of possible equilibrium prices, [p(); pm()]; is larger in markets
with a greater number of rms.
At a broad level, we may understand Proposition 2 as indicating that an increase in N
generates price-decreasing and price-increasing forces. An increase in N may lead to lower
prices, as some rms compete more aggressively for informed consumers, but it may also
lead to higher prices, as some rms become discouraged about the prospect of winning
informed consumers and thus focus on sales to uninformed consumers. Proposition 2
reveals that the balance of these competing forces hinges on a rms cost type: as N rises,
lower-cost rms compete more aggressively and reduce prices, while higher-cost rms
perceive a reduced chance of winning informed consumers and increase prices.
At a more specic level, we may provide further understanding by describing the
structure of the proof. In the Appendix, we show rst that the price of the highest type,
, is unaltered by an increase in N (i.e., 'N() = 0). We then consider the lowest type,
, and suppose to the contrary that the price of this type weakly increases when N rises.
Under this supposition, we show that each higher type,  2 (; ), must weakly increase
its price as well. Given downward-sloping demand, it then follows that information rents
for type  must strictly fall when N is increased; in fact, by (3), we may then conclude
that (p(); ) must strictly fall when N is increased.11 This conclusion, however, implies
11Notice that M() strictly decreases in N for all . Given M() = UN + I, we may also conrm that
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that an increase in N leads to a strict reduction in p(), which contradicts our original
supposition. Thus, an increase in N must induce a strictly lower price for the lowest type,
 (i.e., 'N() > 0). The remaining arguments in the proof then establish that there is a
unique type  2 (; ) whose price is unchanged when N increases and that  < .
We next characterize the equilibrium in the limit where N is su¢ ciently large. As N
goes to innity, the prospect of winning informed consumers approaches zero for a rm
with any cost type  > ; thus, in the limit, the range over which the price-increasing
force dominates the price-decreasing force expands to all  > . Formally, it follows from
(5) that the level of  is strictly decreasing in N , with  !  and thus  !  as
N !1.12 For further characterization, we use the interim-stage prot in (2):
(p(); ) = (pm(); )
U=N
M()
+
Z 

D(p(x))
M(x)
M()
dx: (6)
For  = , since M() = U
N
+ I, if N ! 1, then the RHS approaches zero and thus
p()! . For  2 (; ), if N !1, then p() approaches ep() that satises
(ep(); ) = (ep(); ) + Z 

D(ep(x))dx; (7)
where ep() = pm(). To derive the RHS of (7), we refer to (6) and observe that, for
x 2 (; ), the term M(x)
M()
< 1 and approaches 1 as N !1:
lim
N!1
M(x)
M()
= lim
N!1
U +N [1  F (x)]N 1I
U +N [1  F ()]N 1I = 1:
Similarly, U=N
M()
< 1 and approaches 1 as N !1.13 Now, from (7), we have
 
Z 

d
dx
(ep(x); x)dx = Z 

D(ep(x))dx: (8)
We next follow two steps and identify the limit price ep() for  2 (; ). First, for
U=N
M() and
M(x)
M() are strictly decreasing in N for x > :
12The proof for this result is found in the proof of Proposition 3.
13The terms N [1   F ()]N 1 and N [1   F (x)]N 1 increase in N for small N , but decrease in N for
large N . In the limit, these terms approach zero: for  2 (; ), limN!1N [1  F ()]N 1 becomes
lim
N!1
Nh
1
1 F ()
iN 1 = limN!1 1h 1
1 F ()
iN 1
ln 11 F ()
= 0:
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 2 (; ), we have ep()  pm(). This result follows since, as previously noted, for any
given N , p() < pm() for  < . Second, for  2 (; ), if N becomes su¢ ciently large,
then On-IC() is satised only if p() approaches either the monopoly price pm() or the
xed price pm(), since On-IC() implies
(p(); )
 
U +N [1  F ()]N 1I  (p(b); )U +N [1  F (b)]N 1I for all b > ;
where the terms N [1 F ()]N 1I and N [1 F (b)]N 1I approach zero in the limit.14 Since
pm() < pm() for  < , these two steps lead to ep() = pm() for  2 (; ). We note that
(8) is satised by this limit price.
Proposition 3. In the limit where N !1, (i)  ! ; (ii) p()! ; and for  2 (; ],
p()! pm().
Proposition 3 captures a simple idea: in the limit, the prospect of winning informed
consumers approaches zero for all  2 (; ], and hence the price p() approaches the
monopoly price for all  2 (; ]. This result may be broadly regarded as an incomplete-
information conrmation of the limit results reported in Rosenthal (1980).15
3.2 Informed Consumers and Equilibrium Pricing
We now consider the impact of the fraction of informed consumers, I, on equilibrium
pricing. Referring to (1) in Proposition 1, we see that p() = pm() is independent of I:
By contrast, for  < , (1) implies that p0() strictly increases with I, since
d
dI
@M()=@
M()
=  (N   1)(1  F ())
N 2f()
N [1 I
N
+ (1  F ())N 1I]2 < 0:
These observations establish the following result:
Proposition 4. If I increases, then the equilibrium p() strictly decreases for  2 [; )
and is unchanged for  = .
For a given number of rms, a larger share of informed consumers thus leads to a
strictly lower equilibrium price for each cost type other than the highest cost-type, whose
14In the limit, a rm with  2 (; ) will not mimic type  since p()! .
15As discussed further in Section 5, Rosenthal (1980) analyzes the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria
of a complete-information model.
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price is una¤ected.16 Since the equilibrium price function drops pointwise for all  < , it
follows immediately that an increase in the share of informed consumers delivers strictly
higher expected welfare for both informed and uninformed consumers. We note also that
an increase in the share of informed consumers leads to a wider possible dispersion of
equilibrium prices, since the lowest possible price, p(), strictly falls while the highest
possible price, p(), is una¤ected. It is interesting to contrast these ndings with those
reported in Proposition 2 concerning the impact of an exogenous increase in the number of
rms. An increase in the number of rms is similar to an increase in the share of informed
consumers in that both changes lead to a wider possible dispersion of equilibrium prices;
however, an increase in the number of rms is di¤erent than an increase in the share of
informed consumers in that the former leads to lower equilibrium prices only for lower-cost
rms while the latter leads to lower equilibrium prices for rms with all cost types other
than the maximal cost type. The latter point indicates that the implication of an increase
in the number of rms for the average price and thus uninformed consumer welfare may
be complex. We explore this implication further in the next section.
4 Number of Firms and Welfare
In this section, we investigate how an increase in N a¤ects welfare. Specically, we
consider the e¤ects of an increase in N on consumer surplus, producer surplus and total
surplus, and we also explore the distinct e¤ects of an increase in N on the welfares of
informed and uninformed consumers.
An uninformed consumer faces the expected (posted) price:
PU = Ep() =
Z 

p()dF ():
An informed consumer observes prices and faces the expected minimum price in the
16Limiting results may also be reported. As I ! 0 (i.e., U ! 1), the equilibrium pricing function
approaches the monopoly pricing function. Formally, if I ! 0, then for all  2 [; ], U=NM() ! 1 and
M(x)
M() ! 1 in (6) and hence, p()! pm(). Thus, monopoly pricing occurs as a limiting result when the
number of rms goes to innity (see Propostion 3) or when the share of informed consumers goes to zero.
At the other extreme, if I = 1 as assumed in Spulber (1995), then the price at the top becomes p() = ,
and () in (5) becomes () = 1N 1 [1  F ()]N 1, which indicates that 'N () > 0 for all  <  given
'N () = 0; thus,
@p()
@N < 0 for all  < . Note that the di¤erence between I = 1 and I = 1  " causes a
discontinuity in the choice of p() due to a shift in the boundary value (for I = 1  ", a rm with type 
selects p() = pm() no matter how small is " > 0).
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market:
P I = Ep(min) =
Z 

p()dG()
where min  minf1; :::; Ng and G()  1   [1   F ()]N is the distribution function of
the lowest cost type among N samples. The expected transaction price is
P T =
Z 

p()dH()
where H()  U  F () + I  G(). Let   R r
pm()
D(x)dx where r  supfp : D(p) > 0g.
We may represent the aggregate consumer surplus as
CS =
Z 

Z pm()
p()
D(x)dxdH() + : (9)
We nd it di¢ cult to determine whether CS increases in N directly from (9). To
further characterize the determinants of the relationship between CS and N , we therefore
proceed with the following three steps. First, using p() = pm(); we integrate by parts
and rewrite (9) as
CS =
Z 

H()D(p())p0()d + : (10)
Second, using the interim-stage prot (2), we integrate by parts and represent expected
prot as Z 

(; ; p)dF () = (pm(); )
U
N
+
Z 

M()D(p())()dF (); (11)
where ()  F
f
(). Notice that expected prot as captured in (11) consists of prot at
the top and an expected information rent term.
Our third step is to rewrite (11) in relation to CS in (10). After multiplying by N ,
the LHS of (11) becomes
N
Z 

(p(); )M()dF () =
Z 

(p(); )dH();
where the equality follows since N M()dF () = [U  f() + I N [1 F ()]N 1f()]d =
14
dH(). Integrating by parts, we have
Z 

(p(); )dH() = (pm(); ) 
Z 

H()D(p())p0()d (12)
+
Z 

H()D(p())d  
Z 

H()[p()  ]D0(p())p0()d:
Observe that the second term on the RHS of (12) equals    CS. Similarly, we rewrite
the RHS of (11) after multiplying by N . The second term on the RHS of (11) then takes
the form N
R 

M()D(p())()dF (), which becomes
Z 

D(p())()dH() = D(pm())() 
Z 

H()D(p())0()d (13)
 
Z 

H()()D0(p())p0()d:
Rearranging both sides, we nd that the equality (11) is equivalent to
CS = + (pm(); )I  D(pm())() +
Z 

H()D(p())[1 + 0()]d (14)
 
Z 

H()D0(p())p0()[p()     ()]d:
We observe that the RHS of (14) depends on N through the equilibrium pricing
function, p(), and the function H(). As noted in Proposition 2, whether an increase
in N raises or lowers p() depends on : By contrast, H() is strictly increasing in N
for all  2 (; ): In any case, without further structure on the demand and distribution
functions, it is not clear from (14) whether CS increases or decreases in N .
The expression presented in (14), however, does direct attention to one important set
of circumstances under which CS unambiguously increases in N . In particular, suppose
rst that demand is inelastic: D(p) = 1 for all p  r and D(p) = 0 for all p > r where
r > : For the case of inelastic demand, pm() = r for all  and  = 0. We note that
Propositions 1-4 hold as well when demand is inelastic. Suppose second that 1+0() > 0
for all . To motivate this assumption, we note that for many popular distributions, F is
log-concave (F
f
() is nondecreasing in ) and thus 0()  0 holds for all .17 Referring
to (14) and recalling that H() is strictly increasing in N for all  2 (; ); we see that
17Log-concavity of F is commonly assumed in the contract literature and is satised by many distrib-
ution functions.
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an increase in N strictly raises aggregate consumer surplus if demand is inelastic and
1 + 0() > 0 for all .
Indeed, if demand is inelastic, then the di¤erential equation (1) is immediately solved
from the interim-stage prot (2) and has the analytical solution:
p() =  + (r; )
U=N
M()
+
Z 

M(x)
M()
dx: (15)
Plugging (15) into P T =
R 

p()dH() = N
R 

p()M()dF (); we nd that
P T = rU + I
Z 

dG() + I
Z 

Z 

N(1  F (x))N 1dxdF ():
After successive integration by parts, the third term may be re-written as
I
Z 

Z 

N(1  F (x))N 1dxdF () = I
Z 

()N(1  F ())N 1dF ()
= I
Z 

(1  F ())N0()d
Similarly, the second term takes the form I
R 

dG() = I[   R 

G()d]: Substituting
these expressions and simplifying, we represent the expected transaction price as
P T = r   (r; )I  
Z 

I[G()  (1  F ())N0()]d (16)
= r   (r; )I + ()I  
Z 

[H()  UF ()][1 + 0()]d:
Given that H() strictly increases in N for all  2 (; ); if 1 + 0() > 0 for all , then
P T strictly decreases in N . Since CS = r   P T , this nding matches our nding from
(14) that CS strictly increases in N when demand is inelastic and 1 + 0() > 0 for all :
For the case of inelastic demand, limiting results take a particularly simple form. Using
(15), it is straightforward to verify Proposition 3 for the inelastic demand setting: as
N !1, p()! r  pm() for all  2 (; ] and p()! : The corresponding implication
for the limiting transaction price is delivered using (16): when demand is inelastic, as
N ! 1, H()   UF () ! I for all  > , and so P T ! I + rU . Intuitively, as the
number of rms goes to innity, competition among rms with the lowest possible cost
type implies that informed consumers receive the price  whereas uniformed consumers
16
face discouragedrms and receive the monopoly price, r.
We next consider aggregate producer surplus, represented by PS = N R 

(; ; p)dF ().
From (11), we have
PS = (pm(); )U +
Z 

D(p())()dH(): (17)
Using the rearrangement in (13), we may now conclude that PS strictly decreases in N
if demand is inelastic and F is log-concave (so that 0()  0 for all ).18
Finally, we may now use (13), (14) and (17) to derive total surplus, represented by
TS = CS + PS, as
TS = + (pm(); ) +
Z 

H()D(p())

1  [p()  ]D
0(p())p0()
D(p())

d: (18)
Observe that, if demand is inelastic, then TS as represented in (18) strictly increases in
N . Intuitively, when more rms enter, the expected cost of the rm that sells to informed
consumers decreases. This result holds for any distribution function, F .
We now summarize our welfare analysis to this point:19
Proposition 5. Suppose that demand is inelastic. (i) If 1 + 0() > 0 for all , then an
increase in N strictly raises CS; and if F is log-concave, then an increase in N strictly
lowers PS. (ii) An increase in N strictly raises TS for any F .
Under inelastic demand and 1 + 0() > 0, Proposition 5 implies that, whenever unin-
formed consumers su¤er from an increase in N , informed consumers benet from it.
We next consider the welfare e¤ects of an increase in N on the two respective groups of
consumers. Let CSU and CSI represent surplus of uninformed and informed consumers,
respectively. Integrating (6), we have the following expected prot expression:
Z 

[p()  ]D(p())dF () = (pm(); )
Z 

U=N
M()
dF () +
Z 

Z 

D(p(x))
M(x)
M()
dxdF ().
Next, arguing as in (9) and (10), we may derive that CSU = +
R 

F ()D(p())p0()d.
Integrating by parts the LHS of the expected prot expression and substituting in the
18Note that F must exhibit strict log-concavity, 0() > 0; for a range of  that is adjacent to .
19Our welfare ndings here also hold for su¢ ciently inelastic linear demand functions.
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derived expression for CSU , we nd that
CSU = + (pm(); ) +
Z 

F ()D(p())d  
Z 

F ()[p()  ]D0(p())p0()d (19)
  (pm(); )
Z 

U=N
M()
dF () 
Z 

Z 

D(p(x))
M(x)
M()
dxdF ():
Without further structure, it is challenging to use (19) to determine the impact of an
increase in N on CSU .
We thus turn again to the case of inelastic demand. Evaluating CSU in (19) when
D = 1; D0 = 0; pm() = r and  = 0, and letting PU = r   CSU ; we get that20
PU = r   (r; ) 
Z 

F ()d + (r; )
Z 

U=N
M()
dF () +
Z 

Z 

M(x)
M()
dxdF (): (20)
Thus, even when demand is inelastic, it is not clear whether an increase in N raises or
lowers CSU . The e¤ect of an increase in N operates through the last two terms of the
RHS of (20). As we conrm in the Appendix, we can show that the term
R 

U=N
M()
dF () is
independent of the support,    , and is strictly increasing in N , by rewriting the term
as Z 

U=N
M()
dF () =
Z 1
0
1
1 + I
U
NxN 1
dx for any F , (21)
and showing that
R 1
0
1
1+ I
U
NxN 1dx is strictly increasing in N .
21 By contrast, the e¤ect of
an increase in N on the term
R 

R 

M(x)
M()
dxdF () is elusive and depends on the level of N
and the characteristics of F .
We can report, however, specic circumstances in which a larger number of rms is
disadvantageous to uninformed consumers. In line with our earlier discussion of limiting
results, it follows easily from (20) that PU approaches r as N goes to innity; thus, for
any given N , there exists N > N such that CSU is strictly higher with N rms than
when the number of rms exceeds N: As well, we can identify a setting in which PU as
represented in (20) strictly increases in N . In particular, we nd that an increase in N
20When demand is inelastic, we could equivalently derive PU by substituting (15) into
R 

p()dF ():
21In the proof of Proposition 6 in the Appendix, we directly build on the complete-information analysis
by Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2006) and show that @@N
R 1
0
1
1+ IUNx
N 1 dx > 0 holds. As we discuss below
and conrm in the Appendix, the model analyzed in this paper is a puried version of the complete-
information model when the support     becomes su¢ ciently small. Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez
(2004) show that
R 1
0
1
1+ IUNx
N 1 dx is strictly increasing in N when N is integer. The current result is
based on the di¤erentiability in N .
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has a vanishing e¤ect on the term
R 

R 

M(x)
M()
dxdF () when the support of possible cost
types,   , becomes su¢ ciently small. Combining these ndings with our results about
the term isolated in (21), we can thus conclude that PU strictly increases in N when  
is su¢ ciently small:
The following proposition contains our main ndings about the e¤ects of an increase
in N on uninformed and informed consumers, respectively:
Proposition 6. Suppose that demand is inelastic. (i) For any N , there exists N > N
such that CSU is strictly higher and CSI is strictly lower with N rms than for any
number of rms in excess of N: (ii) For    su¢ ciently small, an increase in N strictly
lowers CSU for any N: (iii) For    su¢ ciently small, an increase in N strictly increases
CSI for any N .
Under inelastic demand, Proposition 6 identies circumstances under which uninformed
consumers are harmed, and informed consumers are helped, when the number of rms
is larger.22 For uninformed consumers, part (i) follows from our discussion above, and
we prove part (ii) in the Appendix. We conrm there that the term
R 

U=N
M()
dF () is
independent of     and strictly increasing in N , and we also show there that the term
@
@N
R 

R 

M(x)
M()
dxdF () approaches zero as   approaches zero. For informed consumers,
part (i) follows since as noted above P I !  as N ! 1. Finally, in the Appendix, we
show that @P
T
@N
approaches zero as     goes to zero. With this nding in place, we can
conclude that part (iii) follows from part (ii).
For the remaining case in which N may be small or     may be large, we present
numerical examples, using the analytical solution (15) under inelastic demand and using
uniform and truncatednormal distributions of cost types.23 In the Appendix, Table
1 selects a few results from extensive examples. The following remark summarizes the
features found in our numerical work:
Remark. Suppose that demand is inelastic. In our numerical work, the following e¤ects
are observed: (i) @P
I
@N
< 0 for any N  2. (ii) If the heterogeneity of cost types is
su¢ ciently large, then there exists N > 2 such that @P
U
@N
< 0 for N < N and @P
U
@N
> 0
for N > N. Otherwise, @P
U
@N
> 0 for any N  2:
22See Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2006) for related ndings in the limiting case of complete information.
23The density function of a normal random variable with mean and variance,  and 2, is given by
()  1p
22
e 
1
2 (
 
 )
2
where  1 <  < 1. The distribution function is () = R  1 (x)dx. The
density function under a truncated normal distribution is dened as f() = ()
() () if     , and
f() = 0 otherwise. The associated distribution function is F () =
R 

f(x)dx.
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We say that the heterogeneity of cost types is su¢ ciently large when the support of
possible cost types,   , is su¢ ciently large, and cost types are su¢ ciently dispersed as
in the uniform distribution, or in the normal distribution with large variance. Under these
conditions in our numerical work, there exists N below (above) which an increase in N
benets (harms) uninformed consumers. Otherwise, an increase in N harms uninformed
consumers for any N  2. Regardless of these conditions, an increase in N benets
informed consumers.
5 Purication and Related Literature
In this section, we explain that the price equilibrium stated in Proposition 1 can be
understood as a purication of the mixed-strategy equilibrium for a complete-information
benchmark model, where production costs are xed at a constant c > 0.24 Building on this
result, we then further describe the relationship of our ndings to those in the literature
that follows Varians (1980) analysis.
Consider an incomplete-information game, in which unit production costs, c(); strictly
rise with type, . In the Appendix, we establish the following purication result: if a
rm with type  uses the unique pricing equilibrium p() of the incomplete-information
game, then the probability distribution induced by p is approximately the same as the
distribution of prices in the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the complete-information game,
when c() approximates the constant c over the support [; ]. This result o¤ers a useful
link between the complete- and incomplete-information games: the complete-information
setting corresponds to the limiting case in which the support of possible costs, c() c();
is su¢ ciently small.
Building on this result, we may clarify the relationship between the predictions of
our model and those that emerge from Varians (1980) model, in which information is
complete and demand is inelastic.25 In Varians (1980) model, an increase in N has no
e¤ect on CS, PS and TS.26 The counterpart result in our model occurs when demand is
inelastic and   approaches zero. In that case, the e¤ects that we describe in Proposition
24This analysis builds on Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002) with a slight extension from their use of inelastic
demand to consider downward-sloping demand functions.
25Specically, our comparison is with Varians (1980) model when the number of rms is taken as
exogenous. Varian (1980) endogenizes the number of rms with a free-entry condition. See also footnote
1 above.
26In the complete-information benchmark model, we nd that, for any demand function, PS is constant
in N: In the same model, if demand is inelastic, then TS is constant in N and so CS is constant in N . For
the complete-information model, we also numerically conrmed that, for a family of downward-sloping
demand functions, an increase in N lowers CSU , raises CSI and lowers CS and TS.
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5 vanish: an increase in N a¤ects CS, PS and TS only through terms that vanish as  
goes to zero. Morgan, Orzen and Sefton (2006) study Varians (1980) model and nd that
an increase in N lowers CSU and raises CSI : The counterpart result in our model again
arises when demand is inelastic and as     approaches zero. Under these conditions,
PU and P I approach the associated complete-information values. From this perspective,
our ndings in Proposition 6 (ii) and (iii) provide a natural pure-strategy counterpart
to Morgan, Orzen and Seftons (2006) ndings. Proposition 6 (i) then establishes a
related nding when the number of rms is increased to a su¢ ciently large number, even
when the support of possible cost types may be large so that the purication result does
not apply. Our numerical ndings provide further insights for other cases. Rosenthals
(1980) work is also related. He studies a complete-information model and reports that
consumers may be harmed in the resulting mixed-strategy equilibrium when the number
of rms increases. Contrary to our model, however, his model assumes that the number
of uninformed consumers per rm is invariant with respect to the number of rms.
Second, we note that price dispersion persists in our model even when     becomes
small. Using the purication result, we can also relate this nding to the earlier literature.
Specically, if     approaches zero, the support of equilibrium prices, [p(); pm()],
approximates the support of the mixed-strategy equilibrium that exists in the complete-
information benchmark model. Observe that, given the price at the top pm(), the price
at the bottom p() is determined by
(p(); ) = (pm(); )
U=N
M()
+
Z 

D(p(x))
M(x)
M()
dx;
where the last term goes to zero as   approaches zero since D(p()) R 

D(p(x))
D(p())
M(x)
M()
dx <
D(p())( ). Further, under inelastic demand, if   approaches zero, then the expected
value and variance of equilibrium prices approach those found in Varians (1980) model.
More generally, while the purication result claries the relationships between our
predictions and those that emerge from Varians (1980) model, we emphasize that our
analysis considers a more general setting in which demand may be downward sloping
and the support of possible costs may be large so that the purication result does not
apply. The more general setting facilitates new results, such as the nding in Proposition
2 that an increase in the number of rms a¤ects di¤erentially the pricing of lower- and
higher-cost rms, and directs attention to the assumptions on the model and distribution
function that su¢ ce for the generalization of other results.
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6 Conclusion
The relationship between the number of rms and price competition is a central issue in
economics. To explore this relationship, we modify Varians (1980) model and assume that
rms are privately informed about their costs of production. Allowing that the support of
possible cost types may be large, we show that an increase in the number of rms induces
lower (higher) prices for lower-cost (higher-cost) rms. We also characterize the pricing
distribution as the number of rms approaches innity, nding that the equilibrium pricing
function converges to the monopoly pricing function for all but the lowest possible cost
type. If demand is inelastic, an increase in the number of rms raises social welfare. If in
addition the distribution of types is log concave, then an increase in the number of rms
raises aggregate consumer surplus and lowers producer surplus. We identify conditions,
however, under which uninformed consumers are harmed, and informed consumers are
helped, when the number of rms is larger. By contrast, when the number of rms is held
xed, a policy that increases the share of informed consumers will benet informed and
uninformed consumers. Finally, we conrm that results previously obtained in Varians
(1980) complete-information model can be captured in our model as a limiting case when
the support of possible cost types approaches zero.
We close by mentioning a possible extension of the model. The model considered above
assumes that consumers are unable to engage in sequential search. We may question
how an increase in N a¤ects equilibrium behavior when this assumption is relaxed by
allowing that, after an uninformed consumer visits a rm and observes that rms price,
the consumer may elect to incur a search cost and visit another rm. In fact, Stahl
(1989) addresses this question in a complete-information setting. An interesting direction
for future work is to consider the impact of N on pricing and welfare in an incomplete-
information setting when sequential search by uninformed consumers is allowed. We plan
to explore this extension in future research.27
7 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. We now show (i) that in any equilibrium p() must be dif-
ferentiable and (ii) that p() dened by (1) is an equilibrium pricing function. Unique-
ness follows since any equilibrium pricing function must satisfy the boundary condition,
p() = pm():
(i) Di¤erentiability: For this proof, notice rst that p() is continuous. If p() were to
27See also Janssen, Pichler and Weidenholzer (2011).
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have a jump, then a rm at the jump point would deviate without a¤ecting the probability
of winning informed consumers. Suppose next b > . Following Maskin and Riley (1984),
we may use the mean-value theorem and write On-IC() as
[M() M(b)](p(); ) M(b)p(p(); )[p(b)  p()]  0;
where p() 2 (p(); p(b)) is chosen to satisfy
p(p(
); ) =
(p(b); )  (p(); )
p(b)  p() :
This is possible since p() is continuous and (; ) = (   )D() is di¤erentiable in .
Similarly, we describe On-IC(b) as
[M(b) M()](p(b);b) M()p(p();b)[p()  p(b)]  0;
where p() 2 (p(); p(b)) is chosen to satisfy
p(p(
);b) = (p();b)  (p(b);b)
p()  p(b) :
Then, for b >  and b    su¢ ciently small, On-IC() and On-IC(b) become
 M(b) M()b 
M(b) (p(); )p(p(); )  p(b)  p()b      
M(b) M()b 
M()
(p(b);b)
p(p(
);b) :
Similarly, for b <  and    b su¢ ciently small, On-IC() and On-IC(b) become
 M(b) M()b 
M(b) (p(); )p(p(); )  p(b)  p()b      
M(b) M()b 
M()
(p(b);b)
p(p(
);b) :
Thus, taking limits as b !  from both sides and using the di¤erentiability of M(), we
can nd the derivative:
p0() =   (p(); )
@M()
@
p(p(); )M()
:
Hence, p() is di¤erentiable. Since p() = pm(); we see that p() is uniquely dened.
(ii) Su¢ ciency: For this proof, we show that the price function p() dened in (1) is
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the equilibrium price function. To this end, we need to show that
(; ; p)  (b; ; p) for all  and b:
Suppose b > . Since 1(x; x; p) = 0 under (1), we have
(; ; p)  (b; ; p) =  Z b

1(x; ; p)dx
=
Z b

[1(x; x; p)  1(x; ; p)] dx
=
Z b

Z x

12(x; y; p)dydx > 0;
where the inequality follows given b >  and x > , since
12(x; y; p) =   @
@x
D(p(x))M(x) > 0:
Thus, (; ; p) > (b; ; p) for b > . Similarly, we can show that (; ; p) > (b; ; p)
for b < . Hence, the price p() dened in (1) satises On-IC(). As we show in the text,
if p() satises On-IC(), then it also satises O¤-IC(). 
Proof of Proposition 2. For the proof, we characterize the function 'N()  @'()@N . We
begin by rewriting 'N() as
'N() =
U
N2
 
(pm(); ) +
Z 

D(p(x))dx  (p(); )
!
+(p(); )[1  F ()]N 1I ln[1  F ()] (22)
 
Z 

D(p(x))[1  F (x)]N 1I ln[1  F (x)]dx 
Z 

D0(p(x))
@p(x)
@N
M(x)dx:
If x! , then the integrand in the last term in (22) approaches zero. This follows since,
if x ! , then p(x) ! pm(x) and so @p(x)
@N
! 0. Since [1  F ()]N 1 ln [1  F ()] ! 0 as
 ! , we can thus show that the endpoint at the top satises 'N() = 0. To characterize
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'N() for  < , we derive that
@'N()
@
=  p(p(); )p0()

U
N2
  [1  F ()]N 1 I ln [1  F ()]
+
(p(); )
p(p(); )p0()
[1  F ()]N 2f()I [(N   1) ln[1  F ()] + 1]

 'N()D
0(p())
p(p(); )
:
Using the di¤erential equation in (1), we rewrite the RHS as
@'N()
@
=  p(p(); )p0()()  'N()D
0(p())
p(p(); )
; (23)
where
()  U
N

1
N
+
1
N   1

+
U
N
ln [1  F ()] + I
N   1 [1  F ()]
N 1 :
The function () is strictly decreasing in  and has a unique type  2 (; ) such that
() = 0, () > 0 for  <  and () < 0 for  > .
We now use (23) to establish two ndings. Our rst nding is as follows: For all
 2 [; ); 'N() < 0: We prove this nding in two steps. First, assume to the contrary
that there exists b 2 (; ) such that 'N(b)  0: Since (b) < 0, we then have from (23)
that @'N ()
@
> 0 for all  2 [b; ) and so 'N() > 0 for all  2 (b; ). The contradiction is
now apparent, since it is then impossible for 'N() to approach the endpoint 'N() = 0
when  ! . Second, assume to the contrary that 'N()  0: If 'N() > 0, then it
must be that 'N(b) > 0 for some b 2 (; ), which leads to a contradiction as in the
rst step. Suppose then that 'N(
) = 0. Since () = 0; we then see from (23) that
@'N (
)
@
= 0. But using 0() < 0, we may establish that @
2'N (
)
@2
> 0 in this case. Thus,
we conclude that 'N(b) > 0 for some b 2 (; ), which again leads to a contradiction
as in the rst step. Our rst nding is thus established. Our second nding is as follows:
If there exists b 2 [; ) such that 'N(b) = 0; then @'N (b)@ < 0. Using (23), we see that
this nding holds since, if b 2 [; ) and 'N(b) = 0, then (b) > 0 and so @'N (b)@ < 0.
We next show that the endpoint at the bottom satises 'N() > 0. Suppose that
'N()  0. Then the ndings presented above imply that 'N()  0 for all  2 (; ).
We know that the interim-stage prot for  is
(p(); ) = (pm(); )
U=N
M()
+
Z 

D(p(x))
M(x)
M()
dx: (24)
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The RHS of (24) is strictly decreasing in N : given M() = U
N
+ I, U=N
M()
and M(x)
M()
are
strictly decreasing in N for x > , and given 'N()  0 for all  2 (; ),
@D(p(x))
@N
= D0(p(x))
@p(x)
@N
=  D0(p(x)) 'N(x)
p(p(x); x)M(x)
 0 for all x 2 (; ):
Since the RHS of (24) is strictly decreasing in N , p() is strictly decreasing in N , which
contradicts the inequality 'N()  0. Thus, 'N() > 0.
We may now establish the main result: there exists a unique type  2 (; ) such
that 'N() > 0 for  2 [; ); 'N() < 0 for  2 (; ) and 'N() = 0 for  2 f; g.
Using 'N() > 0, 'N() = 0 and our rst nding above, we conclude that there exists
 2 (; ) such that 'N() = 0 and that 'N() < 0 for all  2 [; ): The result now
follows since our second nding above ensures that @'N (
)
@
< 0 for any such . 
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) From () = 0, we show that
@
@N
=  @(
)=@N
@()=@
< 0: (25)
The denominator of (25) is negative, since () is strictly decreasing in . We next
establish the inequality, @(
)
@N
< 0, where
@()
@N
=   U
N2

1
N
+
1
N   1

  U
N

1
N2
+
1
(N   1)2

  U
N2
ln[1  F ()] (26)
  [1  F (
)]N 1 I
(N   1)2 +
[1  F ()]N 1 I ln [1  F ()]
N   1 :
From () = 0, we derive a term:
U
N
ln [1  F ()] =  U
N

1
N
+
1
N   1

  [1  F (
)]N 1 I
N   1 :
Plugging this term into (26), we conrm that @(
)
@N
< 0. To conrm that  !  and
thus  !  as N ! 1; we observe further that () ! 0 and 0() !  f()I < 0 as
N !1. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Part (i) follows from arguments in the text. To prove part
(ii), we rst observe that
R 

U=N
M()
dF () =
R 1
0
1
1+ I
U
NxN 1dx for any F , and show that
@
@N
Z 1
0
1
1 + I
U
NxN 1
dx > 0: (27)
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To establish the inequality in (27), we utilize the complete-information analysis by Mor-
gan, Orzen and Sefton (2006). When demand is inelastic, they nd for the symmet-
ric mixed-strategy equilibrium (p) dened in (29) below that @P
U
c
@N
> 0 where PUc =R r
p
pd(p).28 We can then claim that the inequality @P
U
c
@N
> 0, established by Morgan,
Orzen and Sefton (2006), is equivalent to the inequality (27). This claim is immediately
ensured by Z r
p
pd(p) = c+ (r; c)
Z r
p
U=N
U=N + [1  (p)]N 1I d(p)
= c+ (r; c)
Z 1
0
1
1 + I
U
NxN 1
dx;
where the second equality follows after a change of variables.
We now know that
R 

U=N
M()
dF () is independent of     and
@
@N
Z 

U=N
M()
dF () =
@
@N
Z 1
0
1
1 + I
U
NxN 1
dx > 0:
We next complete the proof by showing that for any N , if    approaches zero, then so
does the term:
@
@N
Z 

Z 

M(x)
M()
dxdF () =
Z 

Z 

(; x)dxdF ();
where
(; x)  @
@N
M(x)
M()
:
We rst nd that the integrand,
(; x) =
@M(x)
@N
M()  @M()
@N
M(x)
[M()]2
;
is nite for all  2 [; ] and x 2 [; ]. The denominator is bounded by the range [(U
N
)2; 1].
The numerator has all nite terms; the term,
@M(x)
@N
=   U
N2
+ [1  F (x)]N 1I ln[1  F (x)],
has the maximum   U
N2
at x 2 f; g and the minimum   U
N2
  I
(N 1)e
 1 at x = F 1(1 
28While they consider an inelastic demand setting in which the reservation value is unity, r = 1; and
production is costless, c = 0, it is straightforward to conrm that this nding also holds when r > c > 0:
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e 
1
N 1 ). Thus, from the space of (; x), we can select a pair (; x) that maximizes
the absolute value of the integrand. Note also that, for each term in the numerator or
denominator of (; x), the support of possible values for that term is independent of the
support of cost types, [; ]; hence, we may bound the maximum of the absolute value of
(; x) independently of the support of cost types. Now, given j(; x)j <1, we have
Z 

Z 

@
@N
M(x)
M()
dxdF () <
Z 

Z 

j(; x)j dxdF () < j(; x)j (   );
and conclude that for any N , if     approaches zero, then @
@N
R 

R 

M(x)
M()
dxdF () ap-
proaches zero.
We conclude the proof by establishing part (iii). Our strategy is to show that, for
given F and N , @P
T
@N
approaches zero as     goes to zero. Once this is shown, we can
conclude that part (iii) follows from part (ii). As argued in the text, we know that
P T = rU + I
Z 

dG() + I
Z 

Z 

N(1  F (x))N 1dxdF ():
As in the text, we can rewrite the second and third term on the RHS as
I
Z 

dG() = I[  
Z 

G()d]
and
I
Z 

Z 

N(1  F (x))N 1dxdF () = IN
Z 

F ()(1  F ())N 1d:
We next di¤erentiate P T with respect to N :
@P T
@N
= I
Z 

[1  F ()]N ln[1  F ()]d + I
Z 

F ()[1  F ()]N 1d
+IN
Z 

F ()[1  F ()]N 1 ln[1  F ()]d
= I
Z 

[1  F () +NF ()][1  F ()]N 1 ln[1  F ()]d + I
Z 

F ()[1  F ()]N 1d:
Note that each integrand on the RHS is nite; hence, for any F and N , if   approaches
zero, then @P
T
@N
approaches zero. We now conclude that, for any F and N , if     is
su¢ ciently small, then @P
U
@N
> 0 from part (ii) implies that @P
I
@N
< 0.
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Purication. We present here a purication result for the symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium of the Varian-type complete-information game. Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002)
present a purication result for the case in which demand is inelastic, and we o¤er here
a slight extension of their analysis to consider the case of downward-sloping demand
functions.
Assume that N rms have the common production cost c > 0. A pure strategy for
rm i is pi 2 [c; PR]; where for simplicity PR is given by D(PR) = 0: Let p i denotes
(N   1)-tuple of prices selected by other rms. Firm is prot is then
i(pi;p i) =
(
(pi; c)
U
N
if pi > minj 6=i pj
(pi; c)
 
U
N
+ I
k

if pi  minj 6=i pj and kfj : pj = pigk = k   1.
Assume that (pi; c)  (pi   c)D(pi) is strictly concave with maximizer pm(c) > c. For
rm i, a mixed strategy is a distribution function i dened over the support [p; p], where
p and p are dened below. Firm i0s prot is then
Ei(i; i) =
Z p
p
  
Z p
p
(pi;p i)d1    dN :
As in Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980), we can establish that there is no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, and that there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium,  = i for all
i:
(p) = 1 

(pm(c); c)  (p; c)
(p; c)
U
IN
 1
N 1
8p 2 [p; p] (28)
where p satises (p; c) = (pm(c); c) U=N
U=N+I
and p = pm(c). The equilibrium is established
by the iso-prot condition for p 2 [p; p]:
(p; c)

U
N
+ [1  (p)]N 1I

= (pm(c); c)
U
N
: (29)
We next consider an incomplete-information game, where unit costs are constant in
output but rise in types . We follow closely related arguments by Bagwell and Lee (2010)
and Bagwell and Wolinsky (2002), and show that, if each rm with type  chooses p(),
which is the unique equilibrium in the incomplete-information game, then the probability
distribution induced by p is approximately the distribution of prices in the mixed-strategy
equilibrium of the complete-information game with constant cost c, when the payo¤ rele-
vance of types  gets small. Assume that the unit cost function c() is di¤erentiable and
strictly increasing in  with 0 < c() < c() < PR. Then, as in the text, there exists a
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unique equilibrium p that satises
p0() =
(p(); )
p(p(); )
(N   1)[1  F ()]N 2f()I
U
N
+ [1  F ()]N 1I and p() = p
m(), (30)
where (p(); ) = [p(c())  c()]D(p(c())).
Lemma A1. Given a constant c 2 (0; PR), for any " > 0, there exists  > 0 such
that if jc()  cj <  for all  2 [; ], then the probability distribution induced by the
equilibrium p() is "-close to the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the complete-information
game with the common cost type c.
Proof. Since p() is strictly increasing, the distribution induced by p() is prob ( j p()  x) =
F (p 1(x)). Let c denote the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the complete-
information game with the common cost c. Dene the function pc by pc()   1c (F ()).
The proof is established as an implication of the following three results. First, if each
rm with type  chooses pc(), then the distribution of prices is c. Put di¤erently, pc()
induces the same distribution of prices as does c:
prob ( j pc()  x) = prob
 
 j  1c (F ())  x

= prob
 
 j   F 1(c(x))

= F
 
F 1(c(x))

= c(x):
Second, if c() = c, then pc() solves (30). To show this, we observe that the denition of
pc() gives that
p0c() =
f()
0c(pc())
:
To nd 0c(pc()), we refer to the mixed strategy in (29), which holds as an identity for
all p 2 [p; p]: We may thus di¤erentiate (29) with respect to p, which yields that
p(p; c)

U
N
+ [1  (p)]N 1I

= (p; c)(N   1) [1  (p)]N 2 0(p)I:
Substituting  = c and p = pc(), we obtain
p0c() =
(pc(); c)(N   1) [1  F ()]N 2 f()I
p(pc(); c)
 
U
N
+ [1  F ()]N 1I :
Note that pc() =  1c (F ()) = 
 1
c (1) and thus c(pc()) = 1, which means pc() =
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pm(c). Thus, we may now conclude that, if c() = c, then pc() solves (30). Third, we
claim that, if jc()  cj is small, then p() induces approximately the same distribution of
prices as doesc. This result builds on the the rst and second results. Our rst result tells
us that pc() induces c. Our second result indicates that pc() approximates p() when
c() approaches c; formally, for any " > 0, there exists  > 0 such that if jc()  cj < 
for all  2 [; ], then jp()  pc()j < ". In short, as c() approximates c, the type 
becomes less payo¤-relevant, and so the distribution induced by p(), prob ( j p()  x),
approximates c. 
8 Table
Uniform:  2 [0; 0:1] Uniform:  2 [0; 1] Normal:  2 [0; 0:2]
(; ) = (0:1; 0:05)
Normal:  2 [0; 1]
(; ) = (0:5; 0:5)
N PU P I PU P I PU P I PU P I
2 0.58064 0.48602 0.86267 0.80399 0.60771 0.51745 0.85693 0.79870
3 0.62621 0.42379 0.82070 0.67930 0.64668 0.45332 0.81901 0.68099
4 0.66360 0.37640 0.80769 0.59231 0.68058 0.40561 0.80911 0.60004
5 0.69365 0.33968 0.80577 0.52757 0.70830 0.36867 0.80905 0.53956
6 0.71818 0.31039 0.80853 0.47719 0.73111 0.33909 0.81287 0.49201
7 0.73858 0.28642 0.81333 0.43667 0.75015 0.31476 0.81823 0.45336
8 0.75583 0.26639 0.81896 0.40326 0.76631 0.29431 0.82411 0.42115
9 0.77064 0.24936 0.82484 0.37516 0.78020 0.27683 0.83006 0.39382
10 0.78351 0.23468 0.83067 0.35115 0.79230 0.26168 0.83585 0.37025
20 0.85731 0.15221 0.87520 0.22004 0.91306 0.11099 0.91888 0.14438
50 0.92398 0.07994 0.92842 0.11080 0.92574 0.09499 0.92979 0.12179
100 0.95477 0.04721 0.95623 0.06357 0.95551 0.05706 0.95676 0.07012
200 0.97379 0.02720 0.97425 0.03569 0.97407 0.03313 0.97444 0.03931
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